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even within the territorial seas of other States. This provision is argued to be an impermissible extraterritorial reach
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INTRODUCTION

Exhaustion from sleep deprivation, exacerbated by a lingering
concern over your health and wellbeing; nausea from the rocking of
the boat coupled with the stench of human feces and body odor;
hunger so intense it consumes every waking second of your day;
anxiety from not knowing whether you will ever see, or let alone
speak, to your spouse, sibling, child, or mother ever again. This is
the reality for thousands of Latin Americans who are seized by the
U.S. Coast Guard every year, and they can endure this agony for
days, weeks, and even months on end.1 Many of those who find
themselves in this position are fishermen, who are lured into
smuggling drugs across seas to provide for their families.2 Often,
the U.S. Coast Guard will have tracked their every move at sea,
waiting for a suitable moment to jump in and seize its suspects.
Such seizures will occur beyond the territory of the U.S. and within
the jurisdictions of other States or in the high seas, most often in
the Caribbean and Latin America.3 Thus, the main question presented here is where should these alleged smugglers be prosecuted?
In their home States? In the States of their captors? Answering
these jurisdictional issues requires an examination of U.S. constitutional law and traditional notions of customary international law.
Ultimately, it will be argued that if prosecutors want to try these
cases domestically, they must show a sufficient nexus between
drug smuggling activity and the U.S.
For guidance, this casenote will evaluate the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction through the lens of the Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement Act (MDLEA)—a popularly used federal statute for
prosecuting drug smugglers found outside of U.S. jurisdiction.4
See generally, Seth Freed Wessler, The Coast Guard’s ‘Floating Guant
namos’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/20/
1

magazine/the-coast-guards-floating-guantanamos.html.
2

Id.

Associated Press, Drug smugglers take to the high seas to avoid border
patrol, N.Y. POST (Feb. 24, 2014, 1:54 PM), https://nypost.com/2014/02/24/
3

drug-smugglers-take-to-the-high-seas-to-avoid-border-patrol/.
See infra note 6.
4
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Particularly, this article will observe the maritime drug smuggling
phenomenon as it occurs mainly in other States’ territorial waters
as well a brief analysis applied to the high seas.5
As enacted, the MDLEA prohibits individuals on board a covered vessel from manufacturing, distributing, or possessing, with an
intent to distribute or manufacture, a controlled substance.6 A
“covered vessel” is one that is subject to U.S. jurisdiction.7 Vessels
subject to jurisdiction of the U.S, include, but are not limited to,
vessels “without nationality,” and “a vessel in the territorial water of
a foreign nation if the nation consents to the enforcement of United
States law by the United States.”8 Additionally, this prohibition
applies to acts “committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States.”9 Regarding jurisdiction, the MDLEA asserts that
anyone violating the statute will be tried “in the district in which
such offense was committed,” or, if the offense was carried out
upon the high seas or otherwise outside U.S. jurisdiction, they
“shall be tried in any district.”10 This final, overarching clause is
what raises the most concern because the latter proposition activates
limitless reach for the United States to arrest and prosecute anyone
they consider to violate the MDLEA.11
Recently, an Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals case originating
in the Southern District of Florida held that the MDLEA is unconstitutional, in part, under the Foreign Commerce Clause.12 The
holding in United States v. Davila–Mendoza will be at the crux of
the analysis here, in hopes that the Supreme Court will confront
this issue and give direct guidance to lower courts.13 Thus, two
main contentions will be asserted: the MDLEA’s extraterritorial
reach without consent (1) violates the U.S. Constitution and (2)
High Seas, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com
/topic/high-seas (last visited Mar. 5, 2020) (“High seas, in maritime law, [includes] all parts of the mass of saltwater surrounding the globe that are not part
of the territorial sea or internal waters of a [S]tate.”).
Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a)(1) (2021).
Id. § 70503(e).
Id. § 70502(1).
Id. § 70502(b).
Id. § 70503(b) (emphases added).
5

6
7
8
9

10

11
12
13

Id.

United States. v. Davila–Mendoza, 972 F.3d 1264, 1277 (11th Cir. 2020).

See generally id.
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offends traditional notions of customary international law on extraterritorial jurisdiction. Mainly, it will be argued that the MDLEA
needs to contain a nexus requirement for alleged smugglers found
in foreign territorial waters to comply with constitutional requirements and therefore customary international law. 14 Part II of this
article will walk through the background of drug abuse in the U.S.
and the laws enacted to mitigate the issue. Part III will evaluate the
existing law as it applies specifically to the high seas and provide
an argument against the MDLEA’s reach of jurisdiction for conduct
committed in the high seas. Finally, Part IV will delve into Latin
American Countries’ sentiment, through an examination of treaties,
that concern the MDLEA’s extraterritorial reach on their citizens
and in their territory. Additionally, Part IV will reveal how the
MDLEA’s extraterritorial reach in Latin American territorial waters
is unconstitutional under the Foreign Commerce and Offences
Clauses and offends traditional notions of customary international
law.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Drug Crisis in the United States
Indeed, drug consumption in the U.S. is a problem. Since the
mid–seventies, the U.S. has seen a dangerous, widespread usage of
drugs.15 Drug poisoning deaths peaked in 2017 and consistently
outrank deaths by firearms, car accidents, and homicide. 16 This can
be attributed largely in part to the booming international drug–

See infra note 79. Under the Foreign Commerce Clause, a showing of a
nexus between the illegal activity and the U.S. must be demonstrated. As for
customary international law, some argue that the Protective Principle ought to
permit Congress to authorize the extraterritorial arrests contemplated by the
MDLEA. Id. However, the protective principle also carries with it the burden to
prove the same nexus. Id.
See William H. Latham, United States v. Davis: Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Drug Laws on the High Seas, 16 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG.
641, 642 (1991).
See 2019 Drug Enforcement Administration National Drug Threat Assessment, U.S. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN. (Dec. 2019). In 2017, about 192 people died
every single day from drug poisoning. Id.
14

15

16
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trade which produced over $400 billion in revenue in 2006 alone.17
The drugs mainly responsible for those deaths include cocaine,
heroin, and methamphetamine,18 mostly coming from Latin America.19 The most relevant drug, for purposes of maritime drug
smuggling in Latin America, is cocaine.20 In 2018, global seizures of
cocaine reached 1,131 tons, the second highest amount that year after
cannabis.21 Colombia is the leading nation among Latin American
States, and likely the world, in the cocaine–trafficking industry,
accounting for ninety–percent of cocaine consumption in the U.S.
and eighty percent of the global market in 2009.22 Because of the
concentration of drug–trafficking in this region—or perhaps because
of the District’s leniency23—almost all cases have been prosecuted
out of the Southern District of Florida. 24
As a result, for the past twenty years Congress has sought to
address the rapidly expanding drug problem through legislation
seeking to mitigate consumption.25 In fact, before 1981, the “War on
Drugs” (a term coined by the Nixon Administration) was almost an
afterthought to the aggregate of federal law–enforcement ef-forts.26
President Reagan was at the forefront of efforts to expand the reach
of the drug war by endorsing laws that boost convictions for drug
consumption.27 For cocaine and marijuana specifically,
Charles R. Fritch, Drug Smuggling on the High Seas: Using International
Legal Principles to Establish Jurisdiction Over the Illicit Narcotics Trade and
the Ninth Circuit’s Unnecessary Nexus Requirement, 8 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD.
L. REV. 701 (2009).
U.S. DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., supra note 16.
Id. at 60 (90% of cocaine comes from Colombia and 6% from Peru; 100% of
heroin seizures are found to be coming from Latin American States).
See id. Cocaine is the leading drug produced in, and transported from, Latin
America.
See U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2020, U.N. Doc.
E/20/XI/6 (June 2020).
See PETER CHALK, THE LATIN AMERICAN DRUG TRADE: SCOPE,
DIMENSIONS, IMPACT, AND RESPONSE (2011).
See Wessler, supra note 1.
Id.
See Latham, supra note 15, at 641.
War on Drugs, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com
/topic/war–on-drugs (last visited Oct. 6, 2021).
Id. (Between 1980 and 1997, incarcerations for nonviolent drug offenses
rose from 50,000 convictions to 400,000).
17

18
19

20

21

22

23

24
25
26

27
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the U.S. focused on reducing external supply from Latin America
rather than internal demand from its own citizens.28 Naturally, this
caused a great deal of legislative and executive attention to be
placed not only on regulating the territorial seas of the U.S., but
even the high seas in the Caribbean and Latin America.29 One of
the initial pieces of legislation to reflect U.S. efforts to mitigate
drug–trafficking was the Marijuana on the High Seas Act. 30
B.
The Marijuana on the High Seas Act—A Predecessor to the
MDLEA
As an initial effort to cease drug flow into the U.S., Congress
enacted the Marijuana on the High Seas Act (MHSA).31 Under the
MHSA, federal courts had a right to assert subject matter jurisdiction over U.S. nationals, despite location of capture.32 Nor did this
Act require prosecutors to prove that the drugs were indeed bound
for distribution in the U.S., only that it was a U.S. national or vessel
committing the act of transferring the narcotics.33 So, where the
drug smugglers were not aboard a U.S. vessel or were not U.S.
nationals, prosecution would still be permitted so long as the
smugglers were captured on the High Seas34 and it could be shown
that these foreign nationals had an intent to distribute their controlled substances in the U.S.35 Thus, the nexus requirement makes
an appearance in drug smuggling cases even before the MDLEA
was officially put in place.36 What’s more, this nexus requirement
28
29
30

Fritch, supra note 17.
See infra note 31.
See 21 U.S.C. § 955a(a) (1982), repealed by Maritime Drug Law En-

forcement Act of 1986, 46
U.S.C. app. §1903 (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501-70508 (2016)).
Michael Tousley, United States Seizure of Stateless Drug Smuggling
Vessels on the High Seas: Is it Legal, 22 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 375, 377
(1990).
See M. Lawrence Noyer, High Seas Narcotics Smuggling and Section 955A
31

32

of Title 21: Overextension of the Protective Principle of International
Jurisdiction, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 688, 689–90 (1982).
Id.
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 5 (“High seas, in maritime law,
33
34

[includes] all parts of the mass of saltwater surrounding the globe that are not
part of the territorial sea or internal waters of a [S]tate.”).
Tousley, supra note 31, at 377.
35

36

Id.
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arose where individuals are arrested on the high seas and not even
within another State’s territorial waters.37 The former is often
viewed by courts to afford more sovereignty to the arresting nation
to handle the issue the way it deems fit.38
The Fifth Circuit has addressed the MHSA and extraterritorial
reach for drug–trafficking cases, determining appropriate boundaries for asserting jurisdiction through a nexus requirement.39 For
example, in United States v. Ricardo, the court addressed a case in
which two Americans and five Colombians were arrested on board
a vessel in the high seas for possession of marijuana and charged
under a similar statute.40 Defendants argued that the jurisdiction
cannot be asserted against them because there was no nexus to the
United States.41 In other words, the Defendants’ actions did not
have an intended effect in U.S. territory.42 The Fifth Circuit agreed,
stating that “[t]he United States and this Circuit have traditionally
adhered to the objective principle of territorial jurisdictional, which
attaches criminal consequences to extraterritorial acts that are
intended to have effect in the sovereign territory, at least where
overt acts within the territory can be proved.”43 And wherever overt
acts are not required, jurisdiction can be had upon a showing of
intended territorial effects.44 In the Southern District of Florida,
courts adopted the same perspective on extraterritorial reach in
similar circumstances.45
In United States. v. James–Robinson, for example, the court
held that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to prosecute
foreign nationals on board a vessel 400 miles off the coast of the

37
38
39

Id.
Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124, 1128–29 (5th Cir. 1980);

United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 139 (5th Cir. 1980).
Ricardo, 619 F.2d at 1127; 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1979).
Id. at 1128.
40

41

42
43

Id.
Id. (The court went on to find that the U.S. did have jurisdiction but because

the nexus requirement was sufficiently met in this case).
Id. (citing United States v. Postal, 580 F.2d 862, 885 (5th Cir. 1979)).
See, e.g., infra note 46.
44
45
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U.S. without a showing that defendants “caused, or intended to
cause, some kind of effect in or to the U.S.”46
The court in James–Robinson evaluated Congress’ intent behind the MHSA and found that they expressed an intent to provide
the government with “maximum prosecutorial authority” allowed
by international law.47 The court also notes that the Department of
Justice objected to the MHSA, stating that the lack of any provision
requiring a showing a knowledge or intent to cause an effect in or
to the U.S.
“raises questions of criminal jurisdiction over foreign nationals and foreign vessels. Under international law, a state does not have jurisdiction to proscribe the conduct in question . . . To have jurisdiction over . . . distribution of a controlled substance
by a non–U.S. citizen on foreign vessels on the high
seas, the United States must show an actual or potential adverse effect within its territory.”48
The bill was later amended, but no changes addressed the requirement in question.49 Omitting this provision was immaterial,
however, because Congress’ intent was for courts to exercise authority within the boundaries of international law. 50 While the Department of Justice raised its objections for potential violations of
international law, there was no sign that Congress intended to reject
the application of international law when implementing the
MHSA.51 After all, the MHSA permitted intervention in drug
smuggling and manufacturing where (1) the person is in the territorial waters of the U.S.; (2) there is a U.S. citizen aboard any vessel
on the high seas; or (3) the persons are aboard a vessel subject to

United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340, 1342 (S.D. Fla.
1981).
Id. at 1343.
Id. at 1343 (citing Letter from Patricia M. Wald, Assistant Attorney General (April 11, 1979), reprinted in H. R. REP. NO. 323 (1979)).
Id. at 1343.
See id.
Id.
46

47
48

49

50

51
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the jurisdiction of the U.S.52 Ultimately, this statute was abandoned
because of the challenging burden of proving a vessel’s nationality
in federal court.53 To remedy this adversity, the MDLEA was
adopted to broaden the scope of prosecution, removing the
requirement to prove vessel nationality.54
C. The MDLEA: A Hawkish Effort to Prevent the Importation of
Drugs into the U.S.
By the mid–1980s, drug smuggling had hit an all–time high in
the U.S. and other countries with an overwhelming majority of
drugs coming from Latin America, including countries like Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Mexico.55 Consequently, cartels leading
the charge in drug exportation had exhausted their aerial transportation and found relief in maritime smuggling.56 The U.S. faced
effectively catching drug smugglers in the high seas, while complying with customary international law.57 Specifically, “the high
seas are open to all states, and no state may subject any part of
them to its sovereignty.”58 By 1986, Congress fully adopted the
MDLEA as the appropriate measures and abandoned all versions of
the MHSA.59 The purpose of the MDLEA was to “facilitate enforcement by the U.S. Coast Guard of laws relating to the importa-

21 U.S.C. § 955(a) (1982) (superseded by 46 U.S.C. § 1903 (1988)).
Aaron J. Casavant, In Defense of the U.S. Maritime Drug Enforcement Act:
A Justification of the Law’s Extraterritorial Reach, 8 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 113,
200 (2017).
See generally 46 U.S.C. § 1903 (1988).
Bruce Bagley, The Evolution of Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in
Latin America, 71 SOCIOLOGIA, PROBLEMAS E PRÁCTICAS 99, 102 (2013),
https://journals.openedition.org/spp/1010 (last visited Jan. 13, 2021). (In 1985,
Peru produced around sixty-five percent of the global market’s supply of coca
leaf with Bolivia at twenty-five percent and Colombia at ten percent. Of course,
with this concentration of drug supply coming from mostly Latin American
countries, the U.S. was obligated to play a considerable role in mitigating this
phenomenon. Consequently, the U.S. would need to create and define appropriate laws to address the issue.).
Latham, supra note 15, at 642.
See generally id at 642–43.
Id. (quoting R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 145
(1983)).
Id.
52
53

54
55

56
57
58

59
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tion of illegal drugs and for other purposes.”60 Specifically, the
MDLEA states the following:
Congress finds and declares that (1) trafficking in
controlled substances aboard vessels is a serious international problem, is universally condemned, and
presents a specific threat to the security and societal
well–being of the United States and (2) operating or
embarking in a submersible vessel or semi–
submersible vessel without nationality and on an international voyage is a serious international problem, facilitates transnational crime, including drug
trafficking, and terrorism, and presents a specific
threat to the safety of maritime navigation and the
security of the United States.61
Important here, and at the heart of much controversy surrounding this statute, is the finding that international drug–trafficking
presents a “specific threat to the security of the United States,”
therefore assuming an automatic nexus between smuggling activities and the United States.62 But not all international drug–
trafficking threatens the safety and security of the U.S. by default.
Indeed, Congress intended to pass this statute to activate maximum
prosecutorial authority but while still complying with international
law.63 Thus, while Congress sought to take a strong initiative
against drug importation, it cannot act beyond its enumerated powers under Article I of the Constitution nor did it intend to offend
traditional notions of customary international law. 64
III. A BRIEF EXAMINATION OF EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH ON
THE HIGH SEAS
While the focus of this article centers on the extraterritorial
reach of the MDLEA as it applies particularly to arrests in a foreign
territory, it is worth examining the arguments against prosecu60
61
62
63
64

S. REP. 96-855, at 1 (1980).
46 U.S.C. § 70501 (1986).
Id.
See Wald supra note 47.

As for the latter, intent is irrelevant.
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tion based on acts committed in the high seas. Courts have been
willing to gloss over an analysis of the jurisdiction for arrests made
on the high seas.65 Thus, it is worth analyzing the primary sources
of customary international law, the types of jurisdiction States may
assert under such law, and the existing treaties between the U.S.
and Latin American nations. Such analysis shows that even arrests
made for drug–trafficking on the high seas, rather than foreign territorial waters, without a valid nexus to the U.S. are improper to
prosecute.
A. Setting the Stage with the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) serves as a primary source for guidance in the area of
admiralty law for many States.66 Its contents outline a wide breadth
of generally forbidden practices overseas, State sovereign and
jurisdictional limits, rights of foreign vessels and ships, and so on.67
The U.S. helped with the creation of the UNCLOS, which was later
ratified by 162 countries and the European Union.68 That said,
while the U.S. spearheaded its creation and implementation,
Congress has yet to ratify and sign into the Treaty, citing issues
with seabed mining and delegating too much authority to adversarial countries.69 Yet multiple presidents and congressional reports
have asserted the U.S. intent to abide by the UNCLOS and courts
have even cited its contents when determining best practices or
violations of customary international law.70 Moreover, because an
overwhelming amount of nations have already signed the Treaty
governing the UNCLOS into action, it ought to be considered customary international law regardless of U.S. approval or involve-

65
66

See, e.g., infra notes 86–87.
See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833

U.N.T.S. 397.
67

See id.

Aditya Singh Verma, A Case for the Unites States’ Ratification of
UNCLOS, (May 2, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://diplomatist.com/2020/05/02/a-case68

for-the-united-states-ratification-of-unclos/.
69
70

Id.
Id.; See, e.g., United States v. Aybar-Ulloa, 987 F.3d 1, 6 (relying on

UNCLOS to determine customary international law).
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ment.71 Contained within the UNCLOS is the right for a vessel to
travel through high seas with minimal interference from other
states, while duties for such vessel include sailing under the flag of
their corresponding States.72
Under the rules of international law, the Coast Guard may not
stop or even board foreign vessels when such vessels are navigating
the high seas or even in foreign waters.73 To bypass this limitation,
the U.S. has launched several bilateral agreements with nations in
Latin America and the Caribbean allowing the U.S. Coast Guard to
board and search other States’ vessels when those vessels are
suspected of drug trafficking.74 These are not made in under any
UNCLOS rules and are, instead, only agreements made between the
U.S. and other countries laid out for specific scenari-os.75 Rarely, if
ever, do these arguments mention any instances of a nation’s ability
to prosecute extraterritorially.76 Moreover, consent to prosecute in
these cases does not provide valid grounds for jurisdiction where
the activities have no connection to the prosecuting nation.77
Jurisdiction, in such instance, would only be valid if the activities
occurred within territorial waters of the prosecuting nation or if
there were universal jurisdiction.78
B. The Five Types of Jurisdiction under Customary International
Law
In general, there are five methods in which States can assert jurisdiction: (1) nationality principle; (2) passive personality principle; (3) territorial principles; (4) protective principle; and (5) uni-

S. EXEC. REP. NO. 110–9 (2007).
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 87, 89, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
Id. at art. 110.
Eugene Kontorovich, Beyond the Article I Horizon: Congress’s Enumerated Powers and Universal Jurisdiction Over Drug Crimes, 93 MINN. L. REV.
1191, 1202 (2009).
71

72

73
74

75
76
77
78

Id.
Id.
See, e.g., infra note 81.
See id.
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versal principle.79 The first four require a nexus to the prosecution
nation. 80 For purposes of this casenote, the three main principles to
be discussed are territorial, protective, and universal. Under the
territorial principle, “a state may exercise jurisdiction with respect to
all persons or things within its territory.”81 Thus, under this
principle, vessels on the high seas maintain the nationality of the
flag they fly and are subject to such nation’s exclusive jurisdiction—not that of the arresting nation. 82 When a State relies on protective jurisdiction or asserts the “protective principle,” over an act
committed outside the State’s territory, the act or conduct must
“threaten[] the nation’s security or could potentially interfere with
the operation of governmental functions.”83 Courts in the Eleventh
Circuit relied on the protective principle as a justification for the
MHSA and, later, the MDLEA.84 In United States v. Gonzalez, the
court reasoned that the MHSA had been adopted to rely on the protective principle because proving that a vessel was headed for the
United states is “often difficult.”85 The court also relied on Congress’ finding that drug–trafficking in these areas have a potential
harm and are recognized as crimes by other developed nations. 86
i. The Protective Principle Fails to Justify the MDLEA’s
Extraterritorial Reach on the High Seas
On the other hand, the Southern District of Texas addressed an
issue under the MDLEA in which the defendant was neither a U.S.
citizen nor had ever been to the U.S., and whose acts did not seem

Allyson Bennett, Note, That Sinking Feeling: Stateless Ships, Universal
Jurisdiction, and the Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act, 37 YALE J. INT’L.
L. 433, 436 (2012).
Id.
United States v. Marcano-Godoy, 462 F. Supp. 3d 88, 95. (D.P.R. 2020)
(internal citations omitted).
United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836 (1st Cir. 1980).
United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931, 938 (11th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 939 (addressing arrests made on the high seas specifically); see infra
note 88.
776 F.2d at 939.
Id.
79

80
81

82
83
84

85

86
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to have an effect on the U.S. because he was destined for Europe.87
The district court found a lack of jurisdiction under the protective
principle and asserted that there was no nexus here.88 To support its
argument, they offered that the protective principle is only activated
when conduct by foreign nationals are directed against the “security
of the state or against a limited class of other state inter-ests.”89
Indeed, the district court’s opinion was vacated by the Fifth Circuit
because drug–trafficking automatically “threatens the security of
the United States.”90 Even so, these assumptions are rarely, if ever,
challenged even though it is warranted. For example, the court in
Suerte relied heavily on a Congressional finding that “trafficking in
controlled substances aboard vessels is a serious international
problem and is universally condemned[, and] . . . presents a specific
threat to the security . . . of the United States.’”91 As shown here,
the phrase “trafficking in” assumes that the act includes bringing
drugs “in” the U.S.92
Moreover, the logic applied in Suerte to the congressional finding has no boundaries.93 Nothing in the congressional finding
would prevent the U.S. from prosecuting cases that occurred twenty–five miles off an Australian coast or in any other part of the
world isolated from the U.S.94 Judge Torruella of the First Circuit
phrased it well when he contended that “[r]elying on the protective
principle without any nexus would be to conclude that Congress
could allow for arrests and prosecutions of drug traffickers on the
other side of the world, even without flag–nation consent.”95 Surely, there is no connection inherent in drug smuggling conducted in
these areas and the safety and security of the U.S.96 Thus, justifySee United States v. Suerte, No. CRIM. 00-0659, 2001 WL 1877264 (S.D.
Tex. June 6, 2001) (vacated by United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366 (5th Cir.
2002)).
See id. at *6.
Id. at *5 (citing Restatement (Third) at § 402(3)).
Suerte, 291 F.3d at 371.
Id. at 370 (quoting 46 U.S.C. app. § 1902) (emphasis added).
87

88
89

90
91

92
93
94

Id.
See id.
See id.

United States v. Angulo-Hernández, 576 F.3d 59, 61 (1st Cir. 2009)
(Torruela, J., dissenting from the denial of en banc review).
95

96

See generally id.
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ing jurisdiction for drug–trafficking on the high seas on the grounds
of the protective principle ought to be re–evaluated.
ii. Universal Jurisdiction Does Not Apply to Arrests Made on
the High Seas
Where arrests are made for drug–trafficking on the high seas,
the U.S. would still not be able to prosecute under the guise of the
last principle mentioned above, universal jurisdiction.97 Examples
of crime which would constitute a universal crime or possess characteristics found to impose “universal concern” include piracy,
slavery, and genocide.98 When a universal crime is committed, a
nation may then exercise universal jurisdiction no matter where the
act occurred or whether the act had any nexus to the nation. Comparing these types of crimes to drug–smuggling is futile. While
drug abuse is a serious issue that warrants combative responses, it
cannot be placed on the same level as mass–killings or forced labor.
Simply put, drug trafficking is not a universal crime consistent with
customary international law and should not be recognized as such.99
For that reason, courts should not accept a universal jurisdiction
argument for arrests made on the high seas.
IV.

MURKY WATERS: EXTRA–TERRITORIAL REACH IN FOREIGN
TERRITORIAL WATERS
The primary focus of the debate in lower courts has geared
around extraterritorial reach in foreign territorial waters.100 Thus,
the attention of this note will now shift to arrests made in foreign
territorial seas. To support the contention that extraterritorial arrests
are improper, this section will focus on those Latin American
countries that oppose this type of invasion on their sovereignty.
Next, this section will include background on the Offences Clause
and Foreign Commerce Clause, and an analysis for both as applied
to the MDLEA.
Congress has exceeded its authority by exerting jurisdiction
beyond the reach of the U.S. and such acts are unconstitutional
Infra note 98.
See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Rel. L. §§ 402 cmt. F (1987).
Id.
100 See generally supra note 10.
97
98

99
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under the Offences and Foreign Commerce. As such, two main
constitutional provisions are at issue: the Foreign Commerce Clause
under Article I Section 8, Clause 3, and the Offences Clause101
under Article I Section 8, Clause 10. The Foreign Commerce
Clause states that Congress has the power to “regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes.”102 Under the Offences Clause, Congress has the
power to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on
the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.”103 Both
have been and are continuously used as a basis to assert extraterritorial reach.104
Many argue that the Offences Clause grants Congress sweeping
authority to essentially define international law violations and
impose punishments for those violations.105 Some courts, particularly
the Ninth Circuit, have taken a liking to this position and applied it to
the MDLEA.106 Under the strict lens of constitutionality, this seems
to be an accurate interpretation of the clause.107 Congress, under the
Offences Clause, has the authority to determine what international
law violations would be.108 At any rate, this in101 Many courts refer to this particular section as the “Piracies and Felonies”
clause. While arguments have been made for and against the MDLEA’s extraterritorial reach using this clause, this analysis will center around the “Offences”
clause.
102 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
103
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; for purposes of this case note, the “Offences Clause” will encompass both Congress’ power to define and punish felonies
on the high seas and Offences against the law of nations.
104 See, e.g., United States v. Cifuentes-Cuero, 808 F. App’x 771, 775 (11th
Cir. 2020) (relying on Felonies portion of Offences Tripartite Clause); see also
United States v. Baston, 818 F.3d 651, 667–69 (11th Cir. 2016) (applying Foreign Commerce Clause to justify extraterritorial reach of human trafficking conduct).
105 See, e.g., Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress’s
Power to “Define and Punish . . . Offenses Against the Law of Nations,” 42
WM. & MARY L. REV. 447 (2000) (discussing the underappreciated authority that
the framers of the Constitution granted to Congress and how the courts neglect
this as a topic).
106 See, e.g., United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1159 (9th Cir. 2006)
(reasoning that the MDLEA is constitutional under the Piracies and Felonies
Clause).
107
Cifuentes-Cureo, 808 F. App’x at 775.
10 8

Id.
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terpretation raises serious issues in application by permitting the
exercising of such broad powers worldwide. On the other hand,
specific portions of the MDLEA have already been narrowed by
some Circuit courts, as made evident by the Eleventh Circuit.109
Recently, the Eleventh Circuit expressly held that the broad authority granted to the Executive by the MDLEA as an improper exercise
of the Offences Clause and Foreign Commerce Clause as well as a
violation of the Due Process Clause.110 The court in Davila–
Mendoza primarily addressed the nexus argument, being that the
U.S. cannot prosecute drug smugglers found in another State’s territory where there is connection between their activities and the
U.S.111 And while this case once puts the Eleventh Circuit against
the extraterritorial reach overseas permitted by the MDLEA, the
Supreme Court has yet to address the issue, still leaving open the
feasibility and authorization to enforce the statute.112
A. Latin American Sentiments on U.S. Exercise of Extra–
Territorial Control
Before delving into a legal analysis under the Offences and
Foreign Commerce Clauses, it is worth looking into foreign States’
sentiments toward U.S. intervention and prosecution of conduct
beyond its territory. Particularly relevant for these purposes is the
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substance,113 which will be examined throughout
this section for its assertions, declarations, and objections by
signatory States.

109 See, e.g., United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245, 1249 (11th
Cir. 2012) (finding that Congress is limited, by customary international law, in
punishing crimes that are not deemed violations of the law of nations); but see
United States v. Ruiz-Murillo, 736 F. App’x 812, 816 (11th Cir. 2018) (acknowledging the holding in Bellaizac-Hurtado, but contending such limitation
does not apply where an arrest was made beyond the twelve-mile territorial waters of a foreign state).
110 United States. v. Davila-Mendoza, 972 F.3d 1264, 1277 (11th Cir. 2020).
111 Id. at 1276.
11 2
113

Id.
Infra note 114.
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i. UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substance—A Case Against Prosecuting
Conduct Outside Territorial Reach
After the passing of the MDLEA, dozens of countries came together and established the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance (the
“Treaty”).114 The UN sets out the objective of the Treaty as
“provid[ing] comprehensive measures against drug trafficking,
including provisions against money laundering and the diversion of
precursor chemicals. It provides for international cooperation
through, for example, extradition of drug traffickers, controlled
delivers and transfer of proceedings.”115 Additionally, the contents
of the Treaty expresses concerns of illicit drug use and the rising
trend of drug production, as well as the UN’s desire to combat it
head–on.116 Nonetheless, the Treaty still maintains that it is “
[d]etermined to improve international co–operation in the suppression of illicit traffic by sea . . . [r]ecognizing that eradication of
illicit traffic is a collective responsibility of all States and that, to
that end, coordinated action within the framework of international
co–operation is necessary.”117 Although the United States has ratified this Treaty, it is important to note that because the MDLEA
was passed before ratification, the statute cannot be interpreted in
light of the Treaty.118 As a result, it cannot be argued that the
drafters of the MDLEA were putting it into law to comply with an
existing treaty to overcome objections on grounds of constitutional
law.
Multiple Latin American countries have ratified the Treaty, but
with reservation and objection.119 Most glaring is that of Mexico.
114 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 493.
115 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, United Nations Convention Against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988,
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/illicit-trafficking.html?ref=menuside
(last visited Oct. 6, 2021).
116 See Treaty supra, note 114.
117 Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
118 See Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a)(1)
(2021).
119 See, e.g., infra note 120.
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Mexico objected to the United States third declaration. First, the
United States’ third declaration read as follows:
(3) Pursuant to the rights of the United States under
article 7 of this treaty to deny requests which prejudice its essential interests, the United States shall
deny a request for assistance when the designated
authority, after consultation with all appropriate intelligence, anti–narcotic, and foreign policy agencies, has specific information that a senior government official who will have access to information to
be provided under this treaty is engaged in or facilitates the production or distribution of illegal
drugs.120
Mexico viewed this as a “unilateral claim to justification . . .
which runs counter to the purposes of the [Treaty].”121 Article 7
lays out the guidelines for mutual legal assistance and requires parties to afford one another the “widest measure of mutual legal assistance in investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings in
relations to criminal offences . . .”122 The reason the U.S. declaration is problematic is that the refusal to co–operate under Article 7
will hinder and deter other countries’ efforts to prosecute drug–
trafficking offenses committed within their jurisdiction, especially
when the U.S. makes the initial arrest.123 Operating under the U.S.
declaration, whenever it makes the finding that a government official privy to the disclosed information is somehow in cahoots with
the drug–trafficking activities, the U.S. can then refuse to aid in any
investigation or proceeding. Without disclosure of where the arrest
was made, what individuals were on a vessel, or what those
individuals disclosed in interviews, it becomes nearly impossible to
bring proceedings anywhere but the U.S. As such, the U.S. holds a
monopoly over prosecutions for drug–trafficking offenses.

120
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (Dec. 20,

1988), sa.

Id.
Id.
123 See id.
121
122
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ii. U.S. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties with Latin
American Nations
The Treaty also provides that other mutual legal assistance
agreements may be entered into notwithstanding Article 7.124 The
United States has entered into Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
(MLATs) with nineteen countries, only six of which are Latin
American countries—Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Mexico Panama,
Uruguay, and Venezuela.125 These treaties tend to focus on the help
of identifying, capturing, and aiding in the prosecution of persons.126 For example, in an MLAT with Brazil, assistance explicitly
includes: (a) taking the testimony or states of persons; (b) providing
documents, records, and items; . . . (f) executing requests for
searches and seizures; . .. and (h) any other form of assistance not
prohibited by the laws of the Requested State.127 Thus, even where
there may be some sort of agreement over cooperation and
jurisdiction, the requested state must abide by its own laws.
B. Treatment of MDLEA by Davila–Mendoza and a Forecast for
Future Decisions on the Extraterritorial Reach of the MDLEA
in Foreign Territorial Waters
The Eleventh Circuit took initiative to consider the MDLEA
unconstitutional in United States v. Davila–Mendoza.128 The defendants in Davila–Mendoza consisted of three foreign nationals in
a foreign vessel who were seized and boarded by U.S. Coast Guard
officers in the territorial waters of Jamaica. 129 The officers discov-

12 4

Id.

U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Int’l Narcotics and L. Enf’t Aff., 2012
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) (Mar. 7, 2012); see
also Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, FINDLAW, https://20092017.state.gov/j/inl/rl s/nrcrpt/2012/vol2/184110.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2021)
(explaining that only three Latin American countries have an MLAT currently in
force).
126
See, e.g., Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil on Mutual Legal
Assistance in Criminal Matters, Braz.- U.S., Oct. 14, 1997, S. TREATY DOC NO.
105-42.
127 Id. at art. 1.
128 United States v. Davila-Mendoza, 972 F.3d 1264, 1277 (11th Cir. 2020).
129 Id. at 1267.
125
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ered 3,500 kilograms of baled marijuana on the vessel.130 The captain of the smuggling vessel disclosed to the officers that the vessel
was Costa Rican and that he was Nicaraguan. 131 Subsequently, the
defendants freely admitted to the crime and explained that the engines had stopped working on the boat from the weight of the drugs
on board.132 The defendants were charged with possessing and
conspiring to possess with intent to distribute over 1,000 kilograms
of marijuana under the MDLEA.133 The defendants moved to
dismiss, alleging the statute exceeded Congress’ power under the
Define and Punish Clause and asserted that the district court’s
application of extraterritorial jurisdiction violated their due process
rights.134 In response, the government contended that the extraterritorial application of the MDLEA was valid under the Foreign
Commerce Clause. 135
The court first looked to the Tripartite Clause—Congress’
power to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on
the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.”136 The
government’s argument was quickly dismissed because this arrest
occurred in the territorial waters of Jamaica, not on the high seas.137
Additionally, the “Offences against the Law of Nations” component
was rejected under stare decisis as the Eleventh Circuit has
determined that the clause’s application is “limited to those
offenses recognized by customary international law.”138
The court next evaluated a portion of Article I, which may have
authorized the MDLEA’s extraterritorial reach: the Foreign Commerce Clause.139 As mentioned earlier, the Constitution provides
that “Congress shall have the power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce
Id.
Id.
13 2 Id.
133 Id. (citing 46 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(1), 70503(b)).
134 Davila-Mendoza, 972 F.3d at 1268.
135 See id. The government also argued that the application would fall under the
13 0
13 1

Necessary and Proper Clause.
136 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
137 Davila-Mendoza, 972 F.3d at 1268.
138 Id. (citing United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245, 1249–53
(11th Cir. 2012) (holding the MDLEA unconstitutional under the Offences
Clause)).
139 972 F.3d at 1268.
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with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes.”140 While the court recognized the Foreign Commerce Clause’s broad power afforded to the clause by the Supreme
Court, it also pointed out the Supreme Court’s lack of explicitly
defined boundaries.141 The court reasoned that Congress’ power
under the Foreign Commerce Clause “includes at least the power to
regulate channels of commerce between the United States and other
countries, the ‘instrumentalities’ of commerce between the United
States and other countries, and activities that have a substantial
effect” on commerce between the United States and other
countries.”142 Thus, under a Foreign Commerce Clause analysis it
was treated as necessary to embark on a nexus determination
through the “substantial affects” test.143 The court found the government’s logic as permitting Congress to “globally polic[e]” foreign drug trafficking commerce, invading the sovereignty of other
foreign nations without the U.S. being involved in any capacity.144
The court found that the MDLEA is unconstitutional and exceeded
Congress’ authority under the Foreign Commerce, Offences (a.k.a.
“Define and Punish”), and Necessary and Proper Clauses. 145
This case is groundbreaking because it breaks away from the
position the Eleventh Circuit held for over a decade. 146 For example, in United States v. Estupinan, the court found that the lower
court did not err in failing to sua sponte find that Congress exceeded
its authority under the Piracies and Felonies Clause by enacting the
MDLEA.147 First, it reasoned that the MDLEA was put in
140 US

CONST. art. I § 8 cl. 3.

Davila-Mendoza, 972 F.3d at 1269–70.
142 Id. (quoting United States v. Baston, 818 F.3d 651, 668 (11th Cir. 2016)).
143 See Davila-Mendoza, 972 F.3d. at 1272–74 (reasoning that it needed not
141

determine necessarily that the activities substantially affected interstate commerce, but only that a “rational basis” existed for concluding such).
144 Id. at 1276–77.
145 Id. at 1277–78.
146 See, e.g., United States v. Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d 1147, 1154 (11th Cir.
1985) (rendering extraterritorial prosecution under the MHSA permissible under
the protective principle of international law); United States v. Campbell, 743
F.3d 802, 809–10 (11th Cir. 2014) (reasoning that established precedent permitted extraterritorial prosecution on the high seas under the Offences Clause, even
where the conduct lacked a nexus to the U.S.; see generally United States v.
Estupinan, 453 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2006).
147 Estupinan, 453 F.3d at 1338.
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place specifically to punish acts committed on the high seas based
on the statute acknowledging that drug trafficking is an international problem and is a “threat to the security and societal well–
being of the United States.”148 Additionally, the court explained
there was a lack of cases that applied the nexus requirement between acts committed and the U.S.149 Still, this rationale becomes
problematic because it lacks substantial, thorough analysis. 150 The
MDLEA does not only apply to acts committed on the high seas,
but just as the MDLEA makes clear, and just as it has been applied,
the U.S. may punish acts committed anywhere outside its territory,
not just the high seas.151 It is also not entirely clear whether the
MDLEA would be constitutionally viable even if its scope were
restricted to solely arrests made for criminal conduct on the high
seas, as argued earlier. 152
i.

The Offences Clause of the Constitution in Maritime Law
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to “define and
punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and
Offences against the Law of Nations.”153 This Clause serves as a
positive authority being afforded to the Legislature rather than a
limitation like the Due Process Clause. 154 Even so, this should not be
mistaken as unilateral authority to establish the boundaries of the
Law of Nations and dictate what acts constitute a crime as a matter of
international law. Before the Constitution was ratified and adopted as
the supreme law of the land, admiralty and maritime cases were split
between the Confederation and the States.155 The Framers’ purpose
of setting forth that clause in the Constitution was to transfer the
power to Congress to decide the legality of certain acts under
admiralty law, of course within the proper boundaries.156 Thus, in
defining offenses against the law of nations
Id.
Id.
150 See id.
151 46 U.S.C. § 70503(b) (2016).
15 2 Id.
153 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
154 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
155 United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 147 (1933).
15 6 Id.
14 8
14 9
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Congress sets out penalties and crimes that resemble already existing customary international law, it lacks the authority to single–
handedly establish international standards for the rest of the world
to follow. 157
In United States v. Flores, the appellant was a U.S. citizen accused of murdering another U.S. citizen while in the territorial waters of the Belgian Congo, which was subject to the sovereignty of
the Kingdom of Belgium. 158 The appellee was brought to the Port
of Philadelphia following the crime and was tried in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania.159 The main issue to be resolved was
“whether the jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases . . .
extends to the punishment of crimes committed on vessels of the
United States while in foreign waters.”160 The Court looked to
English courts in the past, as well as existing common law, to reason—and emphasize—that jurisdiction is not only restricted to
vessels within territorial waters, but follows its ships on the high
seas and in extraterritorial jurisdictions.161 Thus, the Court found
that the U.S. may define and punish crimes committed by U.S. citizens on U.S. vessels while within foreign waters where the sovereign has not elected to assert its jurisdiction.162 It also noted that
courts have a duty to apply their own statutes, interpreted in the
light of recognized principles of international law, to offenses
committed by their own citizens. 163
That said, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Flores interpreted a limit on the congressional authority vested by the Foreign
Commerce Clause.164 In United States v. Bellaizac–Hurtado, the
court held that the MDLEA exceeded Congress’s authority under
the Offences Clause, as it applied to extraterritorial drug trafficking
of foreign nationals on foreign vessels.165 The court listed two reasons: (1) customary international law limits Congress’ power to
Id.
Id. at 144–45.
159 Id. at 145.
160 Id. at 150.
161 Flores, 289 U.S. at 150–51.
162 Id. at 159.
16 3 Id.
164 See generally id.
165 United States v. Belliazac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245, 1247 (11th Cir.
2012).
15 7
158
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define and punish crimes pursuant to the Offences Clause; and (2)
drug trafficking is not recognized as a universal crime and thus
does not violate customary international law.166 Additionally, it
found that “‘Offences Against the Law of Nations is Synonymous’
With Violations of Customary International Law.”167 Consequently,
an analysis of customary international law is part of an analysis of
constitutionality under the Offences Clause.168
ii. The MDLEA is not Justified Under the Offences Clause of
the Constitution
Because drug–trafficking is generally not recognized as a universal crime under customary international law, the U.S. cannot
unilaterally prosecute this conduct under the Offences Clause.169
One way in which customary international law would permit jurisdiction is under universal jurisdiction. 170 Generally, the doctrine of
universal jurisdiction permits a nation to “prosecute certain serious
international offenses even though it has no connection to the conduct or participants.”171 In any event, as mentioned earlier the universal jurisdiction doctrine would not apply because drug–
smuggling does not constitute a universal crime like slavery or
genocide.172 The court in Bellaizac–Hurtado agreed with this notion
and asserted that the international community and legal scholars
alike have refused to treat drug trafficking as a violation of contemporary customary international law.173 And while the government argued that “widespread ratification of the 1988 [UN] Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drug and Psychotropic
Substances establishes that drug trafficking violates a norm of customary international law,”174 their argument fails as courts must

Id. at 1253.
Id. at 1251.
168 See id.
169 See generally U.N. Office on Drug and Crime, supra note 115.
170 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 73.
171 Kontorovich, supra note 74.
172 Supra note 98.
173 See United States v. Balliazac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir.
166
167

2012).
174

Id. at 1255.
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look beyond treaty ratification and into actual state practice.175
Although the aforementioned convention has 188 State parties,
several of those States have failed to comply with its restrictions
over a sheer unwillingness; this practice suggests that drug trafficking has not reached the threshold of a customary international
law violation.176 As a result, the court held that Congress exceeded
its power under the Offences clause when it prosecuted the defendants’ conduct in Panama’s territorial waters.177
Indeed, it is well settled in the Eleventh Circuit that “Congress
[cannot] create an international felony of drug trafficking.”178 This
makes an analysis under the Offences Clause, or really any part of
the Tripartite Clause, brief and straightforward.179 Drug– trafficking
is simply not conduct which the U.S. can assert control over in
foreign territory. Such acts do not violate any well–settled
customary international law, and thus cannot be categorized as an
Offense against the Law of Nations.180 Some may argue that the
Protective Principle would permit jurisdiction. Yet this would challenge whether the conduct has a nexus to the safety and security of
the U.S. or somehow interferes with its governmental functions.181
While drug–trafficking does not per se constitute a nexus to the
U.S., this contention has been discussed under a high seas analysis,
and will now be evaluated under the context of the Foreign Commerce Clause.182

175
See id. (citing North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Fed. Republic of Ger.
V. Den.; Fed. Republic of Ger. V. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 43 (Feb. 20)).
176 See Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d at 1255; see also John David Michels,
Keeping Dealers Off the Docket: The Perils of Prosecuting Serious Drug-Related
Offences at the International Criminal Court, 21 FLA. J. INT’L L. 449, 450 (2009)
(referring to the drafters of the Rome Statute who rejected a proposal to consider
drug trafficking a crime within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court).
177 Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d at 1258.
178 United States v. Oliveros-Estupinan, 544 F. App’x. 930, 931 (11th Cir.
2014) (citing Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d at 1245).
1 7 9 Id.
180 See supra note 98.
181 See, e.g., United States v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124, 1128–29 (5th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 139 (5th Cir. 1980).
182 See, e.g., United States v. Bowman, 43 S. Ct. 39, 41 (1922); American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 29 S. Ct. 511, 512 (1909).
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C. The Background and Development of the Foreign Commerce
Clause
The Foreign Commerce Clause can be interpreted to provide
broad authority, “an unbound reading of the Foreign Commerce
Clause allows the federal government to intrude on the sovereignty
of other nations—just as a broad reading of the Interstate Commerce Clause allows it to intrude on the sovereignty of the
States.”183 This section will explain the Foreign Commerce Clause
and how its boundaries are equated with the well–known Interstate
Commerce Clause by lower courts. The Foreign Commerce Clause
does not permit extraterritorial prosecution of drug–trafficking in
foreign territorial waters.
i. The Foreign Commerce Clause in General
Under the Foreign Commerce Clause, Congress has the power
“[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.”184 This Clause is
closely mirrored by the highly scrutinized Interstate Commerce
Clause.185 Mainly, the mutual ground between these two Clauses is
their nexus requirement, or commonly known in Interstate Commerce precedent as the substantial effect rule.186 But a key difference is that the Foreign Commerce Clause has garnered little attention and its powers have scarcely been reviewed by the federal
courts.187 Yet this is an increasingly important area to be explored,
especially as it applies to the thousands of alleged smugglers that
have been, and continue to be, arrested extraterritorially by the U.S.
188

183 United States v. Baston, 818 F.3d 651, 668 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing United
States v. Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d 784, 793 (6th Cir. 2015)).
184 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
185
See Baston, 818 F.3d at 668 (assuming, for purposes of analysis, that the
Foreign Commerce Clause carries the same scope as the Interstate Commerce
Clause).
186 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. 1 (1824); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995) (finding that a
“substantial effect” must be an economic effect).
187 See United States v. Durham, 902 F.3d 1180, 1197 (10th Cir. 2018).
188 Wessler, supra note 1.
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ii. Interstate Commerce Clause in General
The Interstate Commerce Clause derives from Article I of the
Constitution, “The Congress shall have Power . . . to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes.”189 In 1824, the Clause was explained by the
Court in Gibbons v. Ogden, when the Court said, “[t]he power
given to Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
between the Several states, relates to commerce, in the proper acceptation of the term; ‘the exchange of one thing for another; the
interchange of commodities; trade or traffic.’”190 Commerce describes the “commercial intercourse between nations . . . and is
regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse.”191
Regulation of commerce evolved since the 19th century and the
Court has established three separate categories of regulation under
the Constitution.192 Under the Interstate Commerce Clause, Congress can do the following: (1) regulate channels of interstate
commerce; (2) regulate and protect instrumentalities of interstate
commerce as well as the persons or things within; and regulate (3)
“activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”193
iii. The Extraterritorial Reach of MDLEA is Not Justified
Under the Foreign Commerce Clause
“Congress has broad power under [the Foreign Commerce
Clause], ‘[t]o regulate Commerce with Foreign Nations,’ and this
court has repeatedly upheld its power to make laws applicable to
persons or activities beyond our territorial boundaries where United
States interests are affected.”194 The Foreign Commerce Clause, in
its few uses, has been used as a basis to excuse extraterritorial reach
successfully.195 In any event, deliberate inclusion of an effects
requirement for extraterritorial reach in the late Justice ScalU.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. (emphasis added).
, 22 U.S. at 89.
191 Id. at 72.
192
See generally Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
193 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
194 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
195 See, e.g., United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97 (1922); American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 354 (1909).
189

190 Gibbons
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ia’s dissent in Hartford Fire Insurance Company speaks volumes.196 While prosecuting criminal activities beyond territorial
boundaries is acceptable under some circumstances, the clear, unambiguous line must be drawn where activities do adversely affect
against the U.S. 197
Under the Foreign Commerce Clause, the Eleventh Circuit
considered an instance of extraterritorial jurisdiction over sex–
trafficking acts constitutional.198 In United States v. Baston, the
defendant was a convicted international sex trafficker.199 The government had filed a cross–appeal over the district court’s refusal to
award restitution to a victim of sex trafficking in Australia on the
grounds that it would exceed the power of Congress under the Foreign Commerce Clause.200 In its reasoning, the Baston court assumed that “the Foreign Commerce Clause included at least the
power to regulate the ‘channels’ of commerce between the United
States and other countries, the ‘instrumentalities’ of commerce
between
the
United
States and other countries, and activities that have a ‘substantial
effect’ on commerce between the United States and other Countries.”201 The court deemed Section 1596(a)(2)—the statute on extraterritorial jurisdiction over certain trafficking offenses—
constitutional at least as a “regulation of activities that have a ‘substantial effect’ on foreign commerce,” and that Congress had a rational basis to place those acts in “‘an economic class of activities
that have a substantial effect on . . . commerce.’”202 Human trafficking is distinct from drug–trafficking. Human trafficking is a
modern form of slavery and is the largest manifestation of slavery
today.203 Drug use, while no doubt problematic, cannot and should
not be equated to human–trafficking, slavery, or genocide for pur-

46 U.S.C. § 70503(a)(1).
See id.
198 United States v. Baston, 818 F.3d 651, 669 (11th Cir. 2016).
199 Id. at 656.
200 Id. at 657.
201 Id. at 668. (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005)).
2 0 2 Id.
203
Karen E. Bravo, The Role of the Transatlantic Slave Trade in Contemporary Anti-Human Trafficking Discourse, 9 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 555, 555–56
(2011).
196

197
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poses of establishing a nexus.204 Thus, when viewing drug–
trafficking conduct as a whole, it does not fall squarely within a
categorical net for a nexus to exist. 205
The Supreme Court in Baston, had a chance to address the
boundaries of the Foreign Commerce Clause and eliminate the need
to operate under assumptions in its comparison to the Interstate
Commerce Clause. The Court, however, rejected writ and tabled
this controversy for another day.206 Still, Justice Thomas took to a
lengthy dissent arguing that the issue for setting the limits for the
Foreign Commerce Clause is ripe and that the Court should have
granted certiorari.207 Justice Thomas explains the following:
[w]ithout guidance from this Court as to the proper
scope of Congress’ power under [the Foreign
Commerce] Clause, the court of appeals have construed it expansively, to permit Congress to regulate
economic activity abroad if it has a substantial effect
on this Nation’s foreign commerce . . . We should
grant certiorari and reaffirm that our Federal
Government is one of limited and enumerated powers, not the world’s lawgiver.208
If this is any indicator as to the outcome of an inevitable Supreme Court ruling, it seems that Congress has gone beyond its
bounds in authorizing extraterritorial jurisdiction under the
MDLEA.209 Lower courts have been much too quick to find a nexus
automatically where one simply does not exist based on congressional findings and a loose rationale.210 For example, Justice
Thomas looks to United States v. Bollinger,211 where the Fourth
Circuit held that the Foreign Commerce Clause permits Congress to
regulate activities that “demonstrably” affect foreign commerce,
rather than require the more rigorous test of showing a “substanId. at 556.
See generally id.
206 See Baston v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 850 (2017) (certiorari denied).
207 Id. at 851–53.
208 Id. at 851.
209 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a)(1) (2011).
210 See, e.g., Baston, 137 S. Ct. at 850.
211 Id. at 853.
204
205
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tial” effect.212 Moreover, Justice Thomas’s dissent suggests that
the current nexus test is far too lenient and strays away from the
legitimate purpose of the Foreign Commerce Clause; to restrict
congressional power.213 It is not even explicitly clear, from the
Court’s language in past precedent, whether the Foreign Commerce Clause is at least as powerful as the Interstate Commerce
Clause.214
Thus, there are clear arguments to place the MDLEA’s extraterritorial reach beyond the scope of the Foreign Commerce Clause,
as appellate courts interpret it.215 Perhaps the Court takes on this
issue soon to resolve any confusion. The outcome would likely be a
tightening of the Foreign Commerce Clause’s reach.216 That said,
regardless of the outcome it seems that the MDLEA’s demise as it
pertains to the Foreign Commerce Clause is inevitable and only a
matter of time.217
V.
CONCLUSION
In sum, it is difficult to justify the MDLEA on constitutional or
international law grounds. While it was understandably enacted as a
tough reaction to a growing and pressing problem in the U.S.,
Congress has overreached in its attempts to combat drug abuse.
Thus, the U.S. has mitigated Latin American States’ sovereignty by
prosecuting conduct which occurred in their own territory. Some
Latin American States have voiced concern and hesitancy about
permitting this sort of behavior. Despite those who do con212 United

States v. Bollinger, 798 F.3d 201, 215 (4th Cir. 2015).
Baston, 137 S. Ct. at 852 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I am concerned that
language in some of this Court’s precedents has led the courts of appeals into
error. At the very least, the time has come for us to clarify the scope of Con gress’ power under the Foreign Commerce Clause to regulate extraterritorially.”).
214 Id. at 852–53 (“[T]he court of appeals have taken the modern interstate
commerce doctrine and assumed that the foreign commerce power is at least as
broad. The result is a doctrine justified neither by our precedents nor by the
original understanding.”).
215 See, e.g., United States. v. Davila-Mendoza, 972 F.3d 1264, 1277 (11th Cir.
2020).
216 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813 (1993).
217
See generally Davila-Mendoza, 972 F.3d 1264.
213
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sent, this sort of extraterritorial reach over Latin American States
must be analyzed by the Court to aid in a future decision that may
stretch even beyond drug smuggling cases.
Indeed, it has taken time for courts to acknowledge the overextension, for circuits that have, but there are still some that remain
unconvinced of any issues with the MDLEA’s jurisdictional
boundaries.218 In light of the scattered circuit court rulings, the Supreme Court will no doubt need to address this issue. When that
time comes, the Supreme Court must give lower courts guidance on
both the Foreign Commerce and Offences Clause and their application to drug–smuggling and prosecution of other conduct beyond U.S. territory. Perhaps, Davila–Mendoza will provide the
proper posture for the Court to decide on the issue explicitly, once
and for all.

218 See, e.g., United States v. Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d 819 (9th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Van Der End, 943 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2019).

